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CORPORATIONS-CoNFLIcrs BETWEEN BY-LAWS, CHARTERs OR STATUTES
AND LONG TERM EPLOYMENT CoNTRAcrs-The plaintiff was employed
as general manager of the defendant corporation under a three-year
contract. Several months after beginning work, he was removed and his
action for damages followed. The corporation contended that it had a
right to remove the officer under a corporate by-law which stated that
the manager "shall hold office at the pleasure of and upon the terms
and conditions fixed by the Board of Directors."' Held: An officer hired
under a long term contract cannot be removed by the Board of Di-
rectors without cause, even under a corporation by-law that permits
removal of the employee or agent at the pleasure of the board. United
Producers and Consumers Cooperative v. Held, 225 F. 2d 615 (1955).
By its decision the court held that a corporate by-law is not effective
to control the terms of a long term employment contract entered into
by the corporation.2 However, the fact that the officer actually was
removed suggests the necessity for making a distinction between the
corporation's "power" to remove and its "right" to do so. As one
authority has stated it:3
In spite of such a contract the corporation, like any other
principal, has power to revoke the authority of its officers or agents at
any time, subject to liability for this breach of contract... (Empha-
sis supplied)
Kentucky has given the corporation the "power" to remove but does
not allow the corporation to escape liability for breach of the contract
"right" by providing in its General Corporation Act:4
Any officer or agent may be removed by the board of
directors whenever in their judgment the best interests of the corpora-
tion will be served thereby. Such removal, however, shall be without
prejudice to the contract rights of the person so removed.
So an officer or employee cannot specifically enforce his continued
employment by the corporation, but he can obtain damages for breach
of the contract when the corporation exercises its power to remove
him.5
I United Producers and Consumers Co-operative v. Held, 225 F. 2d 615, 617
(CA 9 1955). ,, tr
2 The rule does not a ply to servants". Munn v. Wellsburg, 66 W. Va. 204,
66 S.E. 280 (1909) (boo(eeper).
3 Stevens, Corporations, 766 (2d ed. 1949).
4 Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 271.855(4).
5 The Uniform Business Corporation Act, sec. 32 provides for this and states:
Any officer or agent may be removed by the Board of Directors
whenever in their judgment the best interests of the corporation will
be served thereby, but that such removal shall be without prejudice
to the contract rights of the person so removed.
RECENT CASES
In stating their reasons for such a decision, the court in the Held
case, quoting from a New York decision which arose in the federal
courts, said,6
The consequences of accepting the opposite view are
startling. It would mean that no New York stock corporation could
make a binding contract of employment for a definite term; all officers,
agents and employees would be dischargeable at will without liability
on the part of the corporation, and it would follow that any of them
could leave at will without incurring liability on their part, no matter
how essential their services might be to the corporation. The an-
nouncement of such a doctrine would certainly cause surprise and
consternation to the business world....
A second possible reason for the result reached may have been the
notice factor. It may result in an unreasonable burden to place a duty on
parties dealing with corporations, either as potential officers, agents or
otherwise, to have notice of the contents of all the corporate by-laws
affecting the corporation's ability to contract.7
The majority of decisions are in agreement with the Held case in
so far as the problem is one involving a conflict between a long term
employment contract and a corporate by-law.8 But this is to be dis-
tinguished from two other instances where more confusion exists.
These arise when the long term contract conflicts with either (1) the
charter or articles of incorporation or (2) a statute.
A recent Kentucky decision involved the former in which a conflict
existed between the provisions of a long term employment contract
and the articles of incorporation. 9 In that case the contract provided
that the officer was to be employed by the corporation for ten years.
In addition to his salary of $3,000 a month he was to receive an an-
nuity on retirement in monthly payments of $150 multiplied by the
number of full years he was employed. The officer could terminate
the contract on three months notice; the employer could terminate it
6 Supra note 1 at 618. The case cited was, in re Paramount Publix Corpora-
tion, 90 F. 2d 441 (CCA 2 1937) which construed sec. 60 of the N.Y. Stock
Corporation Law.
7See Stevens, Corporations, 726 (2d ed. 1949). It is very generally held
that one dealing with corporation agents is not charged with notice of the by-laws.
8 Ballantine, Corporations, sec. 107 (Rev. ed. 1946):
By the great weight of authority, however, if a corporation
clothes an officer or agent with apparent authority to bind it by a
particular contract or act, it cannot escape liability by setting up
limitations or restrictions upon his authority contained in the by-laws
not known to the third party. They are regarded as mere internal
regulations, binding as between the corporation, its officers and share-
holders.
See also, Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F. 2d 636 (CCA 3 1930);
Cuppy v. Stollwerck Bros., 216 N.Y. 591, 111 N.E. 249 (1916); Hill v. America
Co-operative Assn, 195 La. 590, 197 So. 241 (1940).
0 Robbins v. Frank Fehr Brewing Co., Ky., 284 S.W. 2d 680 (1955).
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on six months notice. A provision in the articles of incorporation pro-
hibited the corporation from creating or incurring any indebtedness
that would mature more than one year after the date of creation. On
the basis of this provision the corporation contended that both the
salary and annuity provisions should be invalid because they resulted
in debts maturing beyond a year. The court took the position that a
provision in an employment contract contrary to restrictions contained
in the charter or articles of incorporation is invalid. Therefore, as to
the case before them the court upheld the salary provision because
it could be terminated on six months notice, but held the annuity debt
invalid since once incurred it was not terminable, and as a result would
conflict with the charter prohibition. Moreover the debt on the an-
nuity arose after the empldyee had worked a year so the court thought
it clearly contrary to the charter, resulting in the failure of the contract
provision.
It seems that to hold an employment contract subject to the pro-
visions of the charter may place an unjustifiable burden on the con-
tracting employee particularly in view of the decisions allowing the
employment contracts to prevail over the by-law. Moreover, the effect
of the Kentucky court's decision is to hold the employee to constructive
notice of the articles. These are not recorded to provide constructive
notice of the contents to all who deal with the corporation as the
decision would require, but only to provide certain essential informa-
tion as to the business. Although many courts seem to feel that the
recorded charter does give constructive notice'0 the Uniform Business
Corporation Act probably reflects the better policy by providing,"'
The filing or recording of the articles of incorporation, or
amendments thereto, or of any other papers pursuant to the provisions
of this Act is required for the purpose of affording all persons the
opportunity of acquiring knowledge of the contents thereof, but no
person dealing with the corporation shall be charged with construc-
tive notice of the contents of any such articles or papers by reason
of such filing of recording.
Possibly a more important objection to this case is that it allows the
corporation to escape its contract obligation. As one authority ex-
plains it.'2
10 See Stevens, Corp2orations, 727 (2d, 1949) where the courts are criticized
for holding that the articles give constructive notice, but states,
[I]t has been generally held that, since articles of incorporation
are recorded in a public office, persons dealing with a corporation
are charged with notice of the contents of the articles.
"1Uniform Business Corporation Act, (Model) S10 (1928).
12 11 Fletcher, Corporations, 440 (Rev. ed. 1954).
RECENT CASES
[A] defense interposed by a corporation that its agent had
no authority to execute a contract on its behalf is looked upon with
disfavor, especially where the contract has been executed in whole
or in part. It is the policy of the law and the endeavor of the courts
to hold corporations as well as natural persons to their contracts.
But on the basis of its recent decision it would seem likely that the
Kentucky court will hold a long term employment contract invalid
when it conflicts with the provisions in the articles of incorporation.
The third instance is where the long term employment contract
conflicts with a statutory provision. Generally, statutes permitting the
board of directors to remove "officers, agents, or employees" at the
board's pleasure, or will, have been construed as rendering fixed term
employment contracts unenforceable and in some cases void.' 3 This
is well illustrated by a decision under the National Banking Act14
where a long term contract conflicted with the statute.' 5 The statute
provides that directors have power to dismiss officers "at pleasure".
The court ruled that under the statute a long term contract was in-
valid, and thus the corporation does not incur any liability for dis-
missing the officer. Decisions, such as this are more understandable
than those involving provisions in the articles of incorporation since
an expression by the legislature should prevail over provisions or
agreements to the contrary entered into by private parties. But after
deciding that the statute prevails over the contract a second problem
presents itself, namely, to whom does it apply? Although the National
Banking Act applies only to bank officers", these statutes very often
are more general in application and will apply to "officers, agents and
servants"'6 or to "officers, agents, or employees". 7 When that is the
case the interpretation of these terms should be determined in view
of the policy underlying the statutes' enactment. The chief purpose
of statutory provisions of this kind has generally been regarded as
prevention of the board of directors of a corporation from handicap-
ping or directing its policy after retirement from office.'" Therefore, it
should apply to those "officers, agents and employees" who affect
policy and occupy positions of responsibility and trust, 9 e.g. a general
13 Munn v. Wellsburg Bkg. and T. Co., 66 W.Va. 204, 66 S.E. 230 (1909),
merely recognizing the rule that where a statute is applicable a corporation is not
liable on such an employment contract; Llewellyn v. Aberdeen Brewing Co., 65
Wash. 319, 118 P. 30 (1911); Van Slyke v. Andrews, 146 Minn. 316, 18, 178 N.W.
959, 12 ALR 1068 (1920); O'Donnell v. Sipprell, 163 Wash. 369, 1 P. 2d 322,
76 ALR 1405 (1931); 13 Am. Jur. 864.
14 12 USCA see. 24 (1940).
16 Copeland v. Melrose National Bank, 254 N.Y. 632, 173 N.E. 898 (1930).
1 In re Paramount Publix Corp., 90 F. 2d 441 (CA 2 1937).
17 Llewellyn v. Aberdeen Brewing Co., 65 Wash. 319, 118 P. 30 (1911).
18 111 ALR 894, 896 (1937).
19 Supra note 17.
KENTcKY LAw jouRNAL
manager of a corporation,20 a person employed to sell bonds and ap-
point local agents for an annuity company,21 or a managing head of
a corporation's theater department.22 In contrast it should not apply
to non-policy making positions, e.g. a carpenter,23 or a bookkeeper. 24
However, even in the third type situation there is substantial
authority in favor of imposing liability on the corporation. 25 A good
example of this latter view is the interpretation put on the New York
Stock Corporation law26 which allows the directors to remove an "of-
ficer, agent, or employee" at pleasure. This has been interpreted not
to allow removal of an employee under a long term contract.27 The
trend of recent authority seems to be in favor of imposing liability
on the corporation.28
CONCLUSION
Quite often a long term employment contract entered into between
a corporation and one of its "officers, agents, or employees" may con-
flict with either a by-law, corporate charter, or statute which allows
dismissal of the officer at pleasure. Although there is some disagree-
ment in the cases the preferable solution would appear to be to hold
the contract valid and enforceable when in conflict with a corporate
by-law or the charter. The contracting outsider has no reason to have
knowledge of the limitations to contract imposed on the corporation
by either of these. But statutory restrictions on a corporation's ability
to contract presents a more difficult problem. Here it seems preferable
to allow the statute to control the terms of the contract because of the
paramount importance of an expression by the legislature as compared
to an agreement between private parties. However, the full import of
this should be confined somewhat by allowing the statute to apply
only to policy making office-holders rather than mere servants or minor
employees because the underlying policy behind such statutes is to
prevent the board of directors from affecting corporate policy beyond
their term of office.
Wayne Carroll
20 State ex rel Blackwood v. Brast, 98 W. Va. 596, 127 S.E. 507 (1925).
21 Long v. United See. and Annuity Co., 76 W. Va. 31, 84 S.E. 1053 (1915).
22 Supra note 16.
23 McGuire v. Old Sweet Springs Co., 73 W. Va. 321, 79 S.E. 350 (1913).2 4 Munn v. Wellsburg Bkg. and Trust Co., 66 W. Va. 204, 66 S.E. 230 (1909).2 5 Ballantine, Corporations, 263 (Rev. ed., 1946).
26 New York Stock Corporation Law, sec. 60 (1951).
27 In re Paramount Publix Corp., 90 F. 2d 441 (CCA 2 1937).
28 11 Fletcher Corporation, 158 (Rev. ed., 1954).
